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While most scholars focus on the advantages of forgiveness, the negative effects of hasty forgiveness have been largely neglected in the literature.  In this essay I shall argue that in certain contexts granting forgiveness to a wrongdoer could be morally questionable, and sometimes it could even be morally wrong.  Following Aristotle’s view of emotion, and, in particular, his notion of virtuous anger, I shall claim that appropriate, righteous anger is instrumental for justice, and, as a result, inappropriate, or imprudent forgiveness could be an impediment to justice, or even a license for the continuation of injustice. 






Although most researchers concentrate on the advantages of forgiveness, very few discuss its negative aspects.  In this essay I shall argue that in certain contexts granting forgiveness to a wrongdoer is morally questionable, and sometimes it could even be morally wrong.  Following Aristotle, I shall show that appropriate anger is instrumental for justice, and consequently, forgiveness could be an impediment to justice, or even a license for the continuation of injustice. 

2. 	Aristotle’s View of Anger

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states perhaps one of the most controversial views in ethics: “Anyone who does not get angry when there is reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right time and with the right people is foolish” (EN 1126a4-5.)  Aristotle argues that in the appropriate circumstances one is not only justified in being angry, but also, one is required to be angry in order to be considered a moral agent.  Given that interpersonal forgiveness is the act of absolving the wrongdoer of her wrongdoing, forgiveness seems, at least prima facie, to go against the Aristotelian view of “appropriate” or “righteous” anger, as through forgiveness the offender is no longer held accountable for her wrongdoing, and, as a result, the victim of injustice does not seek retribution. 
But why does Aristotle argue for such a controversial view regarding anger?  The reason I think is twofold.  First, he realizes that anger presupposes a series of moral evaluations such as, someone has wronged me, or those I care about, the offence is blameworthy, and he or she should not have done what he or she did.  Second, Aristotle recognizes that when one is angry at the appropriate object at the appropriate time, for the appropriate end, one is much more likely to do something about the injustice in order to make sure that it does not occur again.  For Aristotle, anger is a desire for revenge, and like most emotions, it is a great motivator for action, as one is much more likely to act and do something about one’s situation when feeling anger. Elizabeth Spelman in her article “Anger and Insubordination” recounts a story from Bruno Bettelheim’s book The Informed Heart where he notes how prisoners in Nazi concentration camps made sure not to “notice” the inhumane treatment of other prisoners by the guards, not because they were afraid that if someone saw them noticing they would be punished.  Rather, they were refraining from noticing because they had realized that noticing would make them so angry that they would be faced with the overwhelming desire to do something about it, which in turn would result in certain death (Spelman, p. 272). This case shows how anger is not only closely connected with our views of justice, but also how it overwhelmingly compels us to do something about the injustices we perceive.
According to Aristotle, emotions are not simply unintelligible, uncontrollable responses to situations.  On the contrary, they are a great part of virtue, and as such, they can be intelligent and purposeful. So, virtue is not simply a way of acting, but also a way of feeling the right emotion. For instance, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines virtue as a state by which we stand well or badly with regard to feelings"(EN1105b26). Likewise, having the right feelings "at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end and in the right way, is the mean and best condition and this is proper to virtue" (EN1106b21).  In particular, in Book IV of the Ethics Aristotle says that (the virtue of) good temper is a mean with respect to anger, and the good tempered person tends to be “unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the things, and for the length of time, that reason dictates” (EN1125b33-38).​[2]​  (It is important to notice here that reason does not dictate to refrain from anger, or to forgive the wrongdoer when an injustice happens.)  Aristotle is quick to point out that the deficiency with respect to anger “whether it is a sort of inirascibility, or whatever it is [called], is blamed”; for, those who are not angry when they should, “are thought not to feel things, nor to be pained by them, and since they do not get angry, they are thought unlikely to defend themselves; and to endure being insulted and to put up with insults to one’s loved ones is slavish” (EN11263-8).  Aristotle’s assertion here is of particular importance, as he states that those who do not get angry as they ought on the face of injustice or insult are slavish, because they tolerate it and do not stand up to defend themselves or those they care about.  This, I think, implies that one should not forgive willy-nilly the wrongdoer when he or she commits an injustice, for this would mean that he or she is a coward or even slavish. 
Consider a situation where someone systematically insults me because of the color of my skin, say. If I do not get angry, and instead forgive the offender (thereby absolving him of his wrongdoing,) not only will I not be likely to confront him, but also, he will most likely assume that he is entitled to continue to behave in such way.  On the other hand, if I do get angry, and confront him, he will be less likely to repeat his insults, and besides, he might seriously rethink the situation and see me as someone who is taking herself seriously, and thus is worthy of respect.
When one's anger at someone else is appropriate, the angry person does not only find the wrongdoer responsible for what he or she did, but also blameworthy, because she thinks that the wrongdoer has done something that he or she ought not have done.  Also, and perhaps more importantly, when one is angry with someone one does not only make a negative statement about the other, but also, one makes a statement about oneself.​[3]​ By being angry at the wrongdoer, one makes oneself a "judge" over him or her and shows that one is taking oneself seriously. 





Consider the following true stories that have as their protagonist my father, which will demonstrate, I hope, both the truth of Aristotle’s views, but also the necessity in certain circumstances of forgiveness.  

Story (A) 
During the German occupation of Greece in WWII thousands of people had died of starvation in the cities because the German army consumed whatever little food was available.  (Villages fared a bit better because they had access to the means of production of food.) My father, who at that time was 12 years old, was living in the city of Thessaloniki, and he and his family, like many others, were facing the danger of starvation.  Luckily, his father had a wealthy brother in a village relatively close to the city, who had enough food to give them.  But when they asked him for food, the uncle refused to help them, even though he knew that my father and his family walked many hours in the snow to get to his house. After this incident my father vowed never to forgive this uncle and he never spoke to him.  Many years after the war, the uncle, who was by then 80 years old, came to the city and visited my father to apologize, and ask for forgiveness.  Although the old man appeared sincere, my father refused to forgive him, and showed him out. When I asked him afterward why he was still angry and did not forgive the old man, my father confessed that certain acts should never be forgiven, because of the danger of being repeated. “What if we had died?” he replied. Clearly he thought that absolving someone of a serious wrongdoing is to trivialize the nature of the wrong, and in a way agree that in the whole scheme of things it does not matter.  Obviously, my father was still angry at his uncle.

Story(B) 
My father was at a dentist’s office waiting room with a woman whose turn was before my father’s. (Nobody else was in the waiting room except the woman and my father.)  After the woman had finished her visit with the dentist and went back to the waiting room, she looked for her purse in the seat where she was sitting before.  Once she realized her purse was not there, she accused my father of being the thief, since he was the only person there.  The dentist assured her that my father was a childhood friend with the best reputation in the neighborhood and would never have stolen the purse.  The woman would have none of it.  She was certain that my father was the thief.  My father, meanwhile, looking at the woman in disbelief, thought that she was of a “feeble mind”. The next day the woman came to my father’s store in tears, kneeling and begging him for forgiveness.  My father, again, refused to forgive her, and asked her to leave.  It was obvious to those who witnessed the incident that my father was still angry at the woman and he was still blaming her for her wrong action.
I would like to discuss these stories together, and see first what most people would be inclined to do in such situations, and then show what a moral, virtuous person ought to do.
Was my father justified not to have forgiven his apparently repenting uncle?  More importantly, what should my father have done? Should he have continued to be angry, or should he have been welcoming and forgiving?  In order to answer these questions we need to consider the greatness of the offence.  Very few people would disagree that what my father’s uncle did was morally blameworthy.  The uncle knew that my father and his family were starving and there was a danger that they could die without some food. Despite all this, he refused to help them, showing a callous indifference to their possible starvation and death. Even so, I am sure that some of us would be inclined to say that my father should forgive his uncle, and that he should let bygones be bygones, so to speak.  
Let us change the story a bit, and imagine for a moment that my father and his brother died as a result of his uncle’s refusal to share his food.  Would our feelings about the uncle change?  Most probably, in this case, even if we don’t agree with my father’s refusal to grant forgiveness, most of us would agree that at least then the uncle was blameworthy and should be held accountable for contributing to the deaths.  But what if the uncle had asked for forgiveness upon learning of the death of the children?  Would we forgive him then?  Should we?  I would like to argue that we ought not forgive him, as forgiving him then would simply absolve him from wrongdoing, which certainly would make him feel better, but would not help him realize the seriousness of the offence.  In this case, there is no possibility of reparation and there is no payment of the debt of the injustice that was committed.  
Now consider another scenario. What would our reaction be if after my father’s family had left his uncle’s house, the uncle had realized his mistake and gone back to the city asking my father’s family to forgive him, saying that he had recognized his mistake and that he had miscalculated the amount of food he had?  What is my father’s moral obligation here?  I think that in this case, most of us would agree that although the uncle had committed a serious offence, he had learned from it. Here we have a case where the perpetrator realized his offence, was willing to make aments, showed remorse and offered an apology.  Although in a way this case is similar to the actual case, there is an important difference.  In the actual case the uncle for about twenty years had not shown any interest in repairing his relationship with my father, let alone offering an apology.  Only when the uncle was close to death he decided to come.  The difference between the two stories here is the timing or what the Ancient Greeks called “kairos”.​[4]​  Whereas in the fictional case the uncle quickly realized his mistake and was able to correct it, in the actual case he let things be, and there was no reparation paid.
Why should we not let bygones be bygones, and instead pretend that horrors, evils, and atrocities have never happened? In this I would like to side with Aristotle that serious offences require a righteous anger, and they should not only be punished by the law, but, also, they should not be forgiven.  Because forgiveness logically implies that we hold people responsible for their offense, but also that we absolve them from that offense and in a way that we are willing to forget it –as we implicitly promise that we will (at least try to) no longer have the offence in the forefront of our mind-- forgiving seems to imply that we refuse to hold people accountable for their actions any longer.  So, hasty forgiving in some cases is tantamount to refusal to grant justice and as such it is morally blameworthy. 
Sometimes refusing to forgive might not be easy or popular.  However, if one stands for justice, one should be steadfast.  Dahlia Lithwick argues in “Forgive Not” in the New York Times that regardless of the apparent popular demand to forgive some Bush Administration officials responsible for prisoner abuse at Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib and/or wire tapping, we should instead bring them to justice, so that they can pay for the offences they have committed.  Lithwick cautions against the view that Americans should forgive and forget:

With each repetition of the mantra that Americans just want to turn the page on the past eight years, Americans feel ever better about turning the page.  And why wouldn’t we?  We aren’t merely forgiving Mr. Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Chaney (who admitted in December to approving torture techniques) and others for their actions.  We are also forgiving ourselves.  We are telling ourselves that what happened at Abu Ghraib is behind us, and that what happened at C.I.A. black sites is over.  We are telling ourselves that bad people did bad things under bad circumstances, but that it’s better to forgive and forget, that we are really truly sorry and it won’t happen again.  We sound like a nation of drunks after a bender.  We are full of good intentions, but unwilling to hold ourselves into account.​[5]​ 

I think that although Lithwick is here interested primarily about linking refusal of forgiveness to the absence of legal justice, a similar argument can be made for interpersonal retributive justice, as it implies that when I am forgiving I am showing (either directly or indirectly) that I no longer hold people accountable for their offence, crime, or atrocity.
Let us now return to Story B.  I believe that most people in this case would part ways with my father and would be willing to forgive the woman who mistakenly thought that my father is a thief, thereby ruining his reputation for a few days.  In this case forgiving is morally permissible, or perhaps it is even morally required. The reason that we are likely to want to forgive the woman in this case is because we take it that the offense was relatively small, as she realized that she had made a mistake pretty early, took responsibility for it, and had the courage to go to my father, risked humiliation, offered an apology in front of everyone and asked for forgiveness, even if she didn’t have to do all these things. 
I believe that these two cases show that when forgiveness is given willy-nilly it could impose a serious threat to justice and morality.  In certain situations we should refrain from forgiving perpetrators of serious offenses, even if they offer apologies and even if they are sincere.  As Aristotle taught us, in such cases, we ought to exhibit righteous anger that will enable us to demand revenge in terms of reparations, which in turn, would help reestablish the preexisting moral order.  On the other hand, for most (minor) offenses we should be willing and ready to forgive.  This should be so, even if the perpetrator does not ask for forgiveness, does not offer an apology or does not believe that he/she committed the offense.   Of course, this does not mean that we should not be angry with those who committed such minor injustices.  However, given that we should always be careful to be angry toward the right people at the right time, as Aristotle has shown, we ought to recognize that we should not be angry with people of minor offenses for a long time, as this could have the unwanted consequences of being always angry, and not being, perhaps, sufficiently angry at those we really should.  Human beings and society as a whole are better off when we are both willing to absolve minor wrongs or injustices, but also willing to hold perpetrators accountable for their serious offences, which necessitates not forgiving them.








^1	  I am indebted to many colleagues and friends for offering helpful ideas and criticism.  In particular, I would like to thank Julia B. Griffin for her insightful comments, Beth Butterfield for suggesting a great bibliography, and Bill Eaton for alerting me to the different issues surrounding forgiveness in Holocaust survivors.  Also, I would like to thank Robert Costomiris for proofreading an earlier version of this paper and for offering helpful suggestions.  Finally, I would like to dedicate this essay to the memory of my father, Fotios Magoulas, for teaching me the importance of standing up for justice.
^2	  Aristotle also says in this passage that the good-tempered person has a tendency “to err rather in the direction of deficiency; the good-tempered man is not revengeful, but rather tends to forgive” (1126a1-2.) So, forgiveness is not at all precluded in the Aristotelian Ethics.  Instead, it should be granted at the right time, toward the right people, for the right end, etc.
^3	  This is a point eloquently made by Spelman, p. 269.
^4	  I would like to thank Julia B. Griffin for bringing this to my attention.
^5	  D. Lithwick, ‘Forgive Not’, The New York Times, January 11, 2009, p. wk 11.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